Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Former CIA employee wrote a book to which CIA objects

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10/19, "CIA sues Ishmael Jones," over his book, "The Human Factor," about fraud and how the CIA works against Americans, American Thinker

"The book contains no classified information and I do not profit from it. CIA censors attack this book because it exposes the CIA as a place to get rich, with billions of taxpayer dollars wasted or stolen in espionage programs that produce nothing. Despite the talented work force, more than 90% of employees now live and work entirely within the United States where they are largely ineffective, in violation of the CIA's founding charter."...
  • From preface to the paperback edition of "The Human Factor," by Ishmael Jones
"The key indicator of the CIA's lack of operational accountability thus remains: no top manager has ever been disciplined, demoted, or even reassigned for failure to provide the intelligence the President needs.

In working toward financial accountability, I focused on a single issue. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress gave the CIA more than $3 billion to increase its deep cover capabilities overseas. During the years after 9/11, the CIA was not able to field a single additional effective deep cover case officer overseas. The money disappeared in increased pay packages to employees, expensive boondoggles, the enrichment of contracting companies run by former CIA employees, and the expansion of CIA offices within the United States. More than 90% of CIA employees now live and work within the United States.

In meeting with members of congressional intelligence committees to discuss financial accountability, I was in for a surprise. I had expected a variety of reactions, but not the one I got.
They already knew about this accountability failure, this waste and theft. They agreed with me. But they couldn't do anything about it. There is simply no financial accountability mechanism to deal with waste and fraud at the CIA.

The Government Accountability Office (the GAO) audits government spending. A 2001 GAO report says: "We have not actively audited the CIA since the early 1960s, when we discontinued such work because the CIA was not providing us with sufficient access to information to perform our mission... we have made a conscious decision not to further pursue the issue."


When the waste and stealing start, effective clandestine operations end. The contracting game at the CIA has continued at full force, and has even mutated into a faux industry that uses the jargon of real business. M&A, profit margins, and synergy are discussed as if this were a real American industry instead of a bunch of government contracting scams.

Real human sources work doesn't take much money, just agent pay, hotel rooms, airplane tickets. With the money forced into the system after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it seemed to make the system burst. Intelligence operations ran better before 9/11 simply because there was less money.

Citizens Against Government Waste published one of my articles, in which I suggested that CIA employees be given a whistleblower mechanism, the ability to contact cleared law enforcement officials when they see fraud and waste. The CIA currently has no whistleblower system....

Politicians can make a difference. CIA dysfunction thrives in the political conflict between left and right. Traditionally the CIA has been perceived as a gang of right wingers seeking to topple leftist governments. Some see the CIA as the hand behind worldwide conspiracies and complex dirty tricks. The CIA actually encourages this viewpoint because underlying it is the assumption that the CIA is ruthlessly efficient. I wish the CIA were efficient enough to aggressively confront leftist governments, but it's not.

Many conservatives think the CIA just needs to be unleashed from the confines of Democrat-imposed rules. In the last 10 years, though, through its attacks on Bush via the Plame incident, Iraqi WMD, and leaks on interrogations/torture, the CIA seems to be more a gang of left wingers seeking to topple American conservatives. Politicians should come together and realize that the CIA fails to support Presidents of either party.

The torture issue is a good example of a left versus right conflict that prevents reform. When members of Congress attack each other over torture/interrogations, they are unable to focus on reform of the main mission, which is to find spies who cooperate voluntarily.

Democrats have greater faith in the efficiency of government and tend to be less responsive to intelligence reform. They are reluctant to believe that top-down centralized government can be dysfunctional. The CIA has come to form a political ally, a lobbying group, a supporter. Despite my efforts to make intelligence reform a bipartisan issue, nearly all of the articles I've written have been in conservative media, and most of the meetings I've had with politicians have been with conservatives. Conservatives are quick to acknowledge dysfunction in government bureaucracy....

The second important group that can make a difference are journalists: Despite the growth of internet news and talk radio, the New York Times and the Washington Post retain enormous power. Their reporters have developed excellent sources among top CIA managers. These sources illegally provide classified information on such things as torture/interrogations and Iraq WMD intelligence failures, and in exchange these journalists will not attack the CIA's bureaucracy because to do so would be to attack their sources. A member of the Senate intelligence committee told me he met with CIA officials to propose changes to improve clandestine operations and the CIA fought back through a Washington Post column the very next day. In not confronting intelligence reform, journalists who cover the CIA build careers and win prizes, but in doing so the New York Times and the Washington Post, located in America's two primary terrorist target cities, abandon their readers. In order to protect their readers, these newspapers should pay more attention to intelligence reform. Journalists who explore CIA dysfunction are nearly all political conservatives....

A problem the CIA does not have is attracting talented and intelligent people. Yet it is a problem that the CIA actually claims that it has. In response to criticism or to the latest intelligence failure, CIA management always says it just doesn't have the talent it needs.

CIA Chief George Tenet did it repeatedly after 9/11. CIA Chief Panetta did it shortly after his appointment, and announced plans to go to Michigan to recruit Arab Americans.

But the CIA has always hired good people. These people want to do the best job they can, and if the system were changed, they'd get out and gather the intelligence we need, and they'd start doing it overnight.

Few CIA officers actually speak foreign languages, though most have a latent ability - some training, or a childhood language that hasn't developed. It's just that foreign languages aren't necessary for advancement. Only English is needed at Headquarters and within American embassies....

Any CIA operation which is revealed to the public shows these telltale signs: the operation looks busy, a lot of people are involved, and large amounts of money are spent. Often you'll hear the CIA accused of being risk averse. I agree. However, risk aversion is a complex concept. The CIA will sometimes conduct risky operations in order to achieve a more important goal: looking busy. An example of this type of operation is the Abu Omar operation, in which 21 Agency employees flew into Italy to abduct a single terrorist suspect, or as an eminent scholar commented: "21 people to get one fat Egyptian!" a man who was already under the surveillance of the Italian police. The 21 people stayed in five star hotels and chatted with Hqs on open line cell phones, all at great expense and awful tradecraft. But it was a successful operation in that it spent a lot of money, made a lot of people look active, and suggested the CIA's willingness to take risk.

CIA officials are quick to deny that the organization is risk averse by pointing to risky operations that went wrong. This darker, more complex, passive-aggressive aspect of risk aversion seems to say: We can certainly do risky operations, but here's what happens when you make us get off our couch and do them....

Whenever we see CIA employees released from bureaucracy, we see success. The tactical intelligence production within Iraq is excellent; the early Afghan campaign, featuring no offices and a flat chain of command, just a few guys and bags of money, was extraordinary.

Readers interested in improving the security of Americans and our allies through intelligence reform can write or call their member of Congress, or set an appointment to meet them at their offices in their home district or in Washington. Every member has a web site containing contact information. They're usually very accessible to constituents.

If you have any clout, any connections to politicians or journalists, talk to them. Send me an email via my web site, www.ishmaeljones.com, if you think they'd be open to talking to me."...









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